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AD HOC IAC COMMITTEE (WATCH)

Transcript of Meeting Held in Director's
Conference Room, Administration Building
Central Intelligence Agency, on 8 January 1954

Mr. Huntington D. Sheldon
Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. William C. Trueheart, Office of the Special Assistant,
Intelligence, Department of State

Brigadier General John M. Willems, Deputy AC of S, G-2,
Department of the Army

Captain D. T. Eller (USN), Assistant Head, Intelligence
Branch, ONI, Department of the Navy

Brigadier General Millard Lewis, Deputy Director Intelli-
gence, Headquarters USAF, United States Air Force

Dr. Charles H. Reichardt, Intelligence Division, Atomic
Energy Commission

Colonel Neil M. Wallace, Joint Intelligence Group, The
Joint Staff

Mr. Meffert W. Kuhrtz, Special Agent, Liaison Section,
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ALSO PRESENT

Colonel Howard D. Kenzie, United States Air Force

Lt. Col. James P. Barry, G-2, Department of the Army

Mr. Samuel S. Rockwell, United States Air Force

25X1A [REDACTED], Secretary

25X1A [REDACTED] Reporter

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MR. SHELDON: Are there any comments on the last Minutes?

DR. REICHARDT: I have one, sir, on page 5 about three quarters of the way down. I believe I have obtained General Lewis' thunder, I think it was General Lewis that made the suggestion referred to there and finally adopted.

MR. SHELDON: What part of page 5 are we looking at?

DR. REICHARDT: About three quarters of the way down - "recommended that the paragraph under discussion be made paragraph a, the two paragraphs already approved thus becoming b and c." I remember that he made that finally.

MR. TRUEHEART: I have a very clear recollection of your having said it.

DR. REICHARDT: As I remember I recommended a change in the paragraph, and that led to General Lewis' . . .

MR. SHELDON: Does it make any difference?

GENERAL LEWIS: I don't care.

DR. REICHARDT: That led to General Lewis' much better suggested change.

MR. SHELDON: I don't think it is a matter of substance.

DR. REICHARDT: I did want to --

GENERAL LEWIS: That's you very much, but it didn't make any difference to me.

MR. TRUEHEART: What is your recollection, General?

GENERAL LEWIS: My recollection is that it doesn't make a damn bit of difference as far as I am concerned as long as it was constructive and we get on with it. So let's just leave it as far as I am concerned unless you want to change it.

DR. REICHARDT: I just didn't want to take credit for something which you really did.

MR. SHELDON: Are there any other corrections? If not the Minutes will stand as circulated. I will try to give you clean pieces of paper here. We have circulated what we call tentatively approved paragraphs a, b, and c as of the 8th of January meeting. I see that General Willems has a suggestion to offer. You have circulated this new paragraph?

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GENERAL WILLEMS: Yes, you remember in the last meeting there was some concern, and I believe General Lewis expressed this, that we were not perhaps exploiting all the sources of indications intelligence, and I asked if we might instead of trying to rearrange the paragraph that we were discussing put that in as a separate paragraph, and I think everyone agreed that we would consider it, so I worked out this wording here which I take no pride in at all as the possible paragraph to insure that we do arrange for a complete exploitation of all sources of indications intelligence.

MR. SHELDON: This would be in addition to a?

GENERAL WILLEMS: Yes, it would fit in somewhere in the series. I don't know just where we would want it to go.

MR. SHELDON: Well, suppose we consider it in detail then. Does anybody wish to address a comment to it?

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, I like it myself except that I am not too sure that the term "through the IAC" might not be either limiting or possibly misunderstood. We might add "through the IAC or a member of the IAC", but my point is if you group "through the IAC" together as a body, someone might interpret that to mean that you have to go through the IAC as a body in order to get something, you see. I don't think that is what we mean. At least I wouldn't want it that way.

GENERAL WILLEMS: I certainly didn't intend that.

MR. TRUEHEART: "through the IAC agencies"?

DR. REICHARDT: That might solve the problem -- just the word "agencies".

MR. TRUEHEART: Here we are back again.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Could we say "through the IAC or any member thereof"?

GENERAL LEWIS: All right.

MR. SHELDON: That would cover Millard's point I think.

MR. TRUEHEART: Is this something the Committee should do perhaps rather than the Center, or does it matter? Does this put the Center, in other words, in direct liaison with the IAC, or is this too fine a point to worry about?

MR. SHELDON: Well, you are raising a question now which I was going

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to raise when we get down to considering paragraph f, and that is the relationship between "Committee" and what I call or think of as Staff of the Indications Center. We are going to reach that relationship further down the line, and it does arise here also.

MR. TRUEHEART: It is important I think that we get it very clear what the relationship is.

MR. SHELDON: We are trying to spell out here actually at the moment the duties of the Indications Center's staff, and if we put it among the a, b, c, d's of these instructions, it would then fall on the staff to accomplish this particular function.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Mr. Chairman, it would seem to me that when you get to the position that we are in now that we should have an introductory paragraph -- something about organization -- and say that the Watch Committee will be assisted by, and then Working Group or whatever you call the Indications Center, and then following as it is written now you would have this Working Group arrangement with the IAC, Agency arrangement with the IAC and its members, when actually I mean they would report to that Committee and recommend these things be done. That could be member or Committee as a whole.

GENERAL WILLEMS: I think it is actually going to be awfully hard to differentiate between Committee members and the Working group.

MR. TRUEHEART: Why do you think that? They will certainly be different individuals at least in my opinion.

DR. REICHARDT: Don't look at me again.

MR. SHELDON: In general we mean.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Maybe I am mistaken, but I have the idea from reading over the transcript and talking about it to Colonel Wallace that that Working Committee was on a well we will say more or less 24-hour basis regardless of whether you say it is 24 hours a day. In other words they are on a continuing duty basis while the Watch Committee members are not themselves except on call. They are on call on a 24-hour-a-day basis, but no one expects them to sit in the Indications Center and do that and nothing else.

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ADMIRAL LAYTON: So if these are the working Indians, then they work for the Committee which works for the IAC, and what they do would be in the name of their Committee, and we are getting in, I think, a lot of detail here, that the Watch Committee itself would under broad guidance be entitled and authorized to draw up procedures of what they do, but the Committee is the one that would do these things, the broad things we want to get in rather than the Working Group.

MR. SHELDON: Well, we are hitting at the meat of something that I thought might come up perhaps a little later. Our concept really falls right along those lines. I have a paper here which I don't propose to circulate at the moment. I don't have many copies of it, but we had broken it down into the duties and responsibilities of "the Watch Committee" and then the duties and responsibilities of what we called the Working Group, which would be the Indians running the Center, and do I gather that we want to go back now and deal with the functions of the Committee per se, or shall we continue and work out the details of how the Working Group shall proceed? Admiral Layton's comment would indicate that he feels that it is desirable that we preface at least the instructions to the Working Group by some appropriate phrase. Then if we finish that we can go back if necessary, look at the paper, and see if we want to put certain responsibilities on the Committee per se. Would that be acceptable if we handled it in that manner, in other words, to continue as we are with some appropriate introductory phrase? Our own happened to be this: "The Working Group will support the Watch Committee by . . ." Then you go on and list these various things.

DR. REICHARDT: Mr. Chairman, I was going to sort of second your idea on that that really these jobs on more authority are jobs of both the Committee and the Center so that all you have to . . . well, what I had was "the Watch Committee will maintain an Indications Center which will support the Watch Committee by . . ." Change the verbs to whatever the "ing" means. I keep forgetting those participles.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Now is the Chairman going to be on the Working Group or is he on the Committee?

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MR. SHELDON: My personal concept is that the Committee is the Committee of which the Chairman is the head. The Committee is then supported on a full-time basis by a staff which runs, operates, etc., the Indications Center. That is my personal concept of how this would work.

MR. TRUEHEART: The head of the Staff is not necessarily the Chairman of the Committee, probably not?

MR. SHELDON: I would say no. In other words, the Senior Member of the Staff would report directly to the Committee and presumably to the Chairman of the Committee who would be his . . . he would guide the destinies of the Working Staff. At least that is the way I thought about this thing, and if we are thinking differently perhaps we better get this one out on the table.

GENERAL WILLEMS: I would like to discuss it a moment because, for instance, the Chairman of the Committee it seems to me carries the responsibility for seeing that the whole Watch Committee effort functions properly.

MR. SHELDON: Right.

GENERAL WILLEMS: And if you and I just don't see how you can divorce that . . . Now the Chairman himself while he can accomplish certain things through the head of the Working Group, the head of the Secretariat, or whatever we want to call it, actually he accomplishes his greatest effectiveness by working through the Committee, and it is awfully hard, as I see it now in my mind, to divorce this Working Group functions from the Committee responsibilities. Now surely they don't do it. The Committee doesn't get in there and do all of these things. They don't post the various indicators, etc., but they must share, and I think intimately, in the responsibilities for the functioning of the Watch Committee as a whole.

MR. SHELDON: For instance, today I would be hard put to it to name the members of the Watch Committee. I wouldn't know who they were if somebody said to me, "Now let's send out a message to all the members of the Watch Committee." As individuals I would be hard put to it to know how to address myself because they change from time to time, or quite frequently, and in many instances there is more than one representative of an IAC member present, and it doesn't seem to me there is any clear-cut "member" or Committee. Am I wrong in that?

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CAPTAIN ELLER: I have the latest memorandum, I believe, which shows the Chairman, and then it shows the Watch Committee Secretariat, you know, gives the names, home phone numbers and office phone numbers, and then it gives . . . the next one down is the Central Intelligence Agency, and on there it just gives Watch Officer with the phone number. The State Department it gives Mr. Mose Harvey, and then it gives alternates of about five or six of which Claussen is one, and the Watch Officer, and then it gives the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and lists the various members there. It doesn't differentiate between them. It gives the Duty Officer.

MR. TRUEHEART: Nobody is in doubt about which one of them is.

CAPTAIN ELLER: Office of Naval Intelligence it gives my name with alternates. It depended a little bit on how the Agency phrased its contribution, I think, to the memorandum. Directorate of Intelligence, Air Force, Colonel Hunt's name has been substituted here with alternates, and the JIG with Colonel Wallace, and an alternate, Mr. Easton. Atomic Energy with no alternate. That one is dated fairly recently, 1 September, and I believe there has been . . .

MR. SHELDON: What constitutes the Watch Committee at the moment? I still am not clear as to who the individual members of the Watch Committee are. Would you simply say the Senior Members listed on that sheet?

GENERAL WILLEMS: Yes, I have always looked on it as the Senior Representative from each Agency represented.

MR. TRUEHEART: Wasn't there actually a formal notification to you of the members from each Agency? I was under the impression there was. After the IAC approved it, it is my impression that everybody notified Reber, or something like that, who the members were.

DR. REICHARDT: Who the member and the alternates --

MR. TRUEHEART: Yes.

GENERAL WILLEMS: I think probably that was originally set up, but now it has gotten into a sort of routine. The head of the Watch Committee Secretariat always knows who they are -- there is no doubt about it -- and the Chairman is so informed. There is a lot of routine work that goes on with the Committee here that goes on between Colonel Barry, who is the head of the Secretariat now,

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and formerly was McBride and myself. I found there was a great deal of house-keeping going on, and personally I felt that I was pretty much a member of the working organization there, and I thought that most of the other representatives did too. This is something of a surprise to me here that the differentiation --

MR. SHELDON: Well, I think it is a question of language. Let me see if I can restate my concept, that is, that there would be a Committee to which each Agency would nominate its representative. There would be a Chairman obviously. The Chairman would work in close association with the members of the Committee. There would also be a staff on, I hope, a full-time basis which would be directly responsible to the Committee per se, and the Chairman in particular, as the Chairman of the Watch Committee. Now in that sense the Chairman would be a working member, so to speak, and direct the operations of the Indications Center which need be in collaboration with the other members of his Committee. Is that the general concept held around the table, or am I out in left field on this one?

MR. TRUEHEART: That is my conception.

GENERAL WILLEMS: That is mine too.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: That is essentially what I would say.

GENERAL LEWIS: Very close.

MR. SHELDON: I don't think we are at odds on this. This may be language or something of that sort.

GENERAL WILLEMS: I think it is a question of responsibilities; where we are talking about responsibilities --

MR. SHELDON: Yes.

GENERAL WILLEMS: -- I think the responsibility for the whole operation rests squarely on the shoulders of the Chairman?

MR. SHELDON: Yes.

GENERAL WILLEMS: It seemed to me it should be on the Committee.

MR. SHELDON: Well, with the Chairman as the boss of the Committee so to speak.

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GENERAL WILLEMS: And these responsibilities of getting all of this done, etc., it seems to me that we are dividing the responsibility when we pass these responsibilities down to just the Working Group. Now we hope they will be a very qualified group, but the people that I think we ought to charge all the way through with accomplishing all of these things should be the Committee.

MR. SHELDON: Oh, I couldn't possibly agree with you more.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Maybe we have misunderstood.

MR. SHELDON: There is no difference at all. It is a question of whether we have set it down here in the manner in which we all agree on it.

MR. TRUEHEART: I have a procedural suggestion here which is that we go through the list of items which are on your work sheet, and also the one that General Willems has added, and consider them initially without regard of whether it is the Committee or Working Group that is concerned. The first question, this is something that has to be done by somebody.

MR. SHELDON: Then we can tack a label on it when we have decided what the functions and responsibilities are.

MR. TRUEHEART: The second question, I think, we would ask as we go through them is "Is this for the Working Group to do or the Committee?" If we say it is the Committee we could label it as Committee and then go back later on and look at our Terms of Reference and see whether it covers this.

MR. SHELDON: I think that is a perfectly sound attack on the problem.

MR. TRUEHEART: We also ought to get a heading such as Admiral Layton suggests to --

MR. SHELDON: Why don't we wait with our heading until we have examined these responsibilities in detail, and then it might change our heading if we decide on it now, and we could do that at the end to tidy the paper up. Well with that in mind let us again address ourselves to the new suggestion today which has been amended to read "arrange through the IAC or any member thereof for complete exploitation, etc." Are we now satisfied that that is a new paragraph that we wish to incorporate in our paper? Are we all agreed on that?

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MR. TRUEHEART: I would think we are somewhere combining it with the present a. It seems to overlap it to me. Or did you have something totally different in mind?

GENERAL WILLEMS: Yes, I did. It is in the same field as a. I mean it is the requirement of the indications intelligence, but we did feel it important in working up this original statement of responsibilities to stress the wording in a. I believe if we put this in we tend to obscure that, and I think actually this is a very important function though which hasn't properly been considered before, and I believe it is worthy of being in a separate paragraph. There are two duties. You see, there are two things, two functions, in these two.

MR. SHELDON: One is within the respective agencies themselves, and the other is a memorandum in effect to be sure that the other member agencies scan the world and the other non-IAC agencies to pull it into a big basket all the material that may have an indications characteristic. So it is really two types of responsibility. And I think read in that context it does stand satisfactorily on its own feet as a duty.

MR. TRUEHEART: I think you might make a case that this is a clear duty of the Committee, and perhaps on your other it is properly a function of the Working Group of the Staff.

MR. SHELDON: What is the reaction to that?

ADMIRAL LAYTON: I don't agree with that at all. I don't think you can set the Working Group, or Staff, or whatever you call them, as separate or any different from carrying out the duties that are assigned to the Watch Committee itself as a whole, as an entity, in the name of the Chairman.

MR. SHELDON: You see, we may end up by labeling this as the Watch Committee's responsibilities, and then it is up to the Watch Committee to put on the Working Group the detailed handling and carrying out of these particular responsibilities.

GENERAL LEWIS: As I look at it the Watch Committee is going to be sort of the Board of Directors, you see.

MR. TRUEHEART: That is my concept.

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GENERAL LEWIS: And then these people who are going to be running or working in this Center are going to be the people to do the work in general, and the Chairman of the Board of Directors is going to be the man who is really going to carry the torch and assume the great deal of responsibility to see that things click for the Board.

MR. TRUEHEART: I accept the idea of the Board of Directors if it is understood that this is a substantive Board of Directors, a Board of Directors which is qualified specifically to discuss matters of Soviet intentions and not simply a group which has procedural cognizance of what the Working Group is doing.

MR. SHELDON: I agree with that 100%. You can't detail people who can't sit down and take a problem apart substantively. I agree with that wholeheartedly.

CAPTAIN ELLER: I have a thought on the same subject. I wonder if that note in the paper this morning brought this up, General. There was a Committee of Congress that has discharged the head of their Secretariat. This is off the record. - - - - -

MR. SHELDON: I still visualize that we are all thinking along the same lines.

MR. TRUEHEART: I can certainly buy this paragraph, and let's put it in.

MR. SHELDON: All right, then we should move down to d. -- "maintain in readily usable form, "etc.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Mr. Chairman, before you go on could I ask where you are going to put this new paragraph? Is it going to be a new a.?

MR. SHELDON: All right.

GENERAL LEWIS: You can stick in that one, you see.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: We are going to have a piece of paper to start from first base. I don't particularly have any feeling about it one way or the other except I would like to see it in some place where it would belong, and this thought struck me since this is a complete blanket. This is "to arrange the exploitation of every" -- this is without exception then -- "domestic or foreign source of indications of intelligence." That probably is the paragraph a.

GENERAL WILLEMS: I think we could drop out "complete" too. If you exploit it there is no degree. I mean if you exploit it you exploit it.

GENERAL LEWIS: Yes, actually what you are trying to do is you are trying to be sure that you cover the sources not covered by a. -- that might not be covered by a. Isn't that right?

GENERAL WILLEMS: Yes.

GENERAL LEWIS: And if you did want to limit it, you might in some way put it that way that you have covered certain sources in a. Now you are covering all the other sources. You might have something in which you are interested.

MR. SHELDON: I think you have said everything you can possibly say if you delete completely. I don't think that adds anything. Does that help you, Captain Eller? Does that help you?

CAPTAIN ELLER: Yes, sir, I was thinking possibly where we have the wording "source of indications intelligence" related to "Soviet/Communist intention". Might pin it down to just exactly what we are talking about, at least what I feel we are talking about. That is rather a minor point.

MR. SHELDON: You mean you want to tack on there what we tacked on before?

CAPTAIN ELLER: Yes, that phrase.

MR. SHELDON: "Soviet/Communist intentions as set forth in C,2 above."

CAPTAIN ELLER: Yes, sir, I believe that is what we mean.

MR. SHELDON: We must mean that.

CAPTAIN ELLER: In the new a., yes, sir.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Just add it to after "intelligence" there.

MR. SHELDON: Does anybody have any objections to adding . . . ?

MR. TRUEHEART: We are sure that when we get through we will be able to say this in a less cumbersome way.

MR. SHELDON: I have a feeling here that there is some meeting here that is going to be possible, but it may not be possible around the table. All right, then that becomes the new a. again, and I think we can now address ourselves to what in effect would be e., temporary e. perhaps. I personally have a feeling that the phrase "of Soviet-Communist preparations for attack" again

is a less tight phrase than we have been trying to write into this paper, and something along the line of "pertaining to the Committee Mission", or something along those lines would seem to me a little tighter there.

GENERAL LEWIS: Why do you need anything? Why can't you end this sentence with "indications"?

MR. SHELDON: Because it is for sure that what you haven't got you can't keep in useable form; therefore, once you have got it why put another label on it? I would agree with that. Why relabel it?

GENERAL LEWIS: Yes, we do the same thing in e. I think now that you have spelled out pretty well exactly what you are talking about up above you can end this sentence with "indications".

MR. SHELDON: Now you have got these things and why put another label on them?

GENERAL WILLEMS: Yes, that is quite right. Did you have in mind calling it indications intelligence?

GENERAL LEWIS: Yes, whatever you want to do.

GENERAL WILLEMS: In the vernacular around here we all speak of that. I think that is what we all mean. I think we said that in the first paragraph up there and thereafter refer to that as "indications intelligence".

MR. SHELDON: Otherwise we have to spell out "as set forth in C,2 above" and in every paragraph.

MR. TRUEHEART: I would suggest dropping again the word "complete" and the word "all" in that thing so as to give the Committee some flexibility in what sort of files they maintain. I am not sure that we need to have every last piece of information in these files, particularly when you consider the period . . . the historical thing, I mean.

MR. SHELDON: The only thought I would offer there would be that here again it is the men under the gun which have to carry these things out, and when he reads this if he gets the impression, "Now look we have to get the most we possibly can get" . . . if he gets that thoroughly drilled into him we are apt to get more rather than less.

MR. TRUEHEART: What we want, I think, is the most useful files, not necessarily the biggest.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: All the pertinent available --

GENERAL LEWIS: Yes, I think there is another sidelight to that too. I think every one of us knows of something that this Watch Committee now does not have that it should have, and I think the object of this exercise has got to be that somehow we see that everything that is pertinent gets to the Watch Committee. Now it may be that we are going to have to recognize, and I think we will have to recognize the fact that there are certain very sensitive items that only a very few people should know anything about that shouldn't be generally broadcast, that shouldn't be spread over more than those who positively need to know, in which case we set up within this organization a certain number of people by name who will handle super-sensitive things which someone of the Agencies wouldn't want to toss in if he thought the thing was going to be given general distribution. See what I mean? And I think that if we do recognize that there will be some of those things, if we do make provisions for very limited distribution, and I mean truly limited distribution, so that the person who is tossing the thing in isn't going to be worried about security, then I think that we will see that everything does get at least to the heart of this organization even though it won't get full distribution to all of the curiosity seekers.

MR. SHELDON: Well, Millard, you do introduce there a concept, which I don't find too friendly, and that is a circle within a circle in which I would consider to be an essentially ultra-sensitive project in any event.

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, I would be willing to do that if that is what it took to see to it that every member organization would be happy to give everything, and I just don't believe unless you put it on a very limited basis and have, we will say, specific persons designated for super-sensitive things that these organizations are going to be happy to throw certain things in.

MR. SHELDON: Well, I would prefer to take this view, and that is that I would not expect to detail either as the CIA member on the Committee or any individual who might be required to add to the Indications Center . . . I

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would not put anybody there to whom I would not be willing to give everything that we have.

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, I haven't quite gotten to you yet, and I don't want to take up the time here, but I believe in this one because I think that here is one of our greatest defects. There are just so darned many people sitting in your Watch Committee meeting now that there are certain things that are never brought out that should be brought out, and the reason is that a good many of those people don't have any reason to know. I could get a small group -- a very small group -- and tell them, and they could handle it without all the other people knowing about it. Now if that is what it takes -- a group within a group -- to do it, all right. Maybe we can make this thing so air tight, and the distribution so closely controlled, a hand carried distribution to certain selected people and no other distribution of such information. Maybe you can do it on the basis that you could let anyone who is working in the Center have it, but I don't even believe that either. I believe that this has got to be something like the Comint clearance arrangement of limiting, of having certain designated people who are going to know super-sensitive things, and there won't be very many. Now I am only talking with a fraction of one percent of the information, and yet it is very vital information -- very vital.

CAPTAIN ELLER: I might add to that, General, that the Navy's feeling has been that the number of people in the Watch Committee, you know, at each of our meetings possibly weakens the security, and I really don't know, but there have been several indications that there is additional material which the Watch Committee isn't cognizant of. I don't know anything that the Navy has that isn't in or wouldn't be put in if anyone could segregate it out and recognize it, but I know there are some operational matters which undoubtedly all the agencies have that border on . . . I think we might consider some of them before we finish awfully closely on the resulting indicators will be tied to these operations which we have no way at present of differentiating, but possibly some reduction in the scope or the number of people, the clearance

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arrangement that General Lewis mentioned might materially improve the amount of material that is presented.

MR. SHELDON: Well, I frankly had in mind that if and when this general scheme went into effect that there probably would be fewer people actually attending the Watch Committee meetings per se.

MR. TRUEHEART: I think it is the only way you can have any chance of getting a full disclosure. I am not even sure you can get it then.

GENERAL LEWIS: I am not sure you would either, and yet I think that full disclosure has got to be our objective, and we have got to go to whatever ends are necessary. Sure you can discuss the way it works. You discuss a top secret in a larger group than you discuss Comint than you discuss super-sensitive things, and if you just . . . And if we recognize that and set the organization up in such a way that we are sure that the super-sensitive things are going to get in there somehow.

MR. SHELDON: I am all for your concept. I would like to try to avoid having a ring within a ring because I think that tends partly to destroy the effectiveness of the whole organization. I think you would recognize that the man working in a Center of this sort if he felt that the guy next to him had information available to him that was not available to the individual across the way, I think you would build up a kind of a tension which might develop into an unhealthy situation.

GENERAL LEWIS: I agree with that, but your problem is for him not to know just like your problem is with Comint.

MR. TRUEHEART: You might just work out something like IAC does -- just having a regular Executive Session at the end of each meeting, and kick everybody out but one man from each Agency.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Yes, that was the way I was thinking too, and items could be marked if necessary "For Executive Committee" or "Executive Session". We have felt too that there are too many people over there in the Watch Committee meetings. That apparently was the way it was operating when I came there. And if you use this Executive Session system we can perhaps permit . . .

We don't have to restrict it too much -- the actual meeting. Excuse me, there is some good accomplished by having certain people in there. They add to the discussion in certain fields. They add a great deal because you get an expert in who really can give the facts in a certain field, and I think they have contributed, but we have had many visitors who come in. They want to see the Watch Committee function. I think there is an advantage to that because we get the idea known; we let them see how it functions, etc. Many of those people contribute in some way to the Watch Committee function.

MR. TRUEHEART: But I don't think anybody could resent an Executive Session, particularly if you held one every time you met. You might not have anything to discuss, but be understood everybody leaves at the end of the meeting, and then --

MR. SHELDON: That is another way of handling it.

DR. REICHARDT: It might be that the conclusions are always considered in Executive Session just as a matter of giving you the idea it is just a mechanism.

MR. SHELDON: I still, however, would prefer to see the full-time working members of such caliber as to want their being given the most sensitive material. I still feel that is the optimum solution.

GENERAL LEWIS: I agree with that, but it is going to depend then upon how many working members there are.

MR. TRUEHEART: The people who are going to control the information are just not going to let it go if you have too large a number, in other words.

GENERAL LEWIS: I think you have a good one to think about there. You have a very good one to think about. I would like to chew on that a while, but that idea of maybe having a recommendation to the Executive Session to consider the conclusions in Executive Session . . . in other words, the main meeting comes up with a recommendation from the Center personnel that they recommend that the Executive Session consider a conclusion of so and so and so and so, and then you go into Executive Session, and if there is anything additional to consider, you consider it. If you don't you just say, "Well, that is it," but you go through the routine each time of having an Executive Session so that you provide your normal cover, yes.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Mr. Chairman, I would like to make an observation. While I recognize that it is necessary the Center get all of the information, all of the intelligence, and it is necessary they know of operations except that intelligence might develop from those operations. Well, now if these are operations . . . let us say, take one, for example. Let us say it is the (Off the Record). Well, we will say that at Executive Session today the Watch Committee knows about that and have discussed it -- that something might come out of this, but they can't tell the Working Group, so they secure, and they go home, and the next day this (Off the Record). The Watch Committee are home having dinner, and all of a sudden all hell breaks loose. The Working members know nothing about this, might miss the import, and it might be of such importance that they might want to call the Watch Committee into immediate session so they could go to their IAC principals in accordance with the Directives so the machinery could be put in motion which exists. I mean it might start being the little trigger that started this thing going, and if the Working Group didn't know it, General, they wouldn't be in a position to do it.

I would like to bring out one thing. They had had the same situation before Pearl Harbor. They were holding Comint so tightly in Washington that they weren't going despite the recommendation of Field Commanders that they be furnished this, and they were told very piously that this was all political, but anything that ever pinged upon the military or their responsibilities, these Commanders, that they would be told . . . they would be advised. They were not advised. It is brought out that they had these various messages. The Watch Committee have had, I am sure, that, some bright young man would have been able to say, "This looks bigger to me than we have figured it up, and if you . . . " And I realize that you are going to have difficulty getting these sensitive things, but we have to face facts rather than talk around them, and if you set up anything wherein only a certain number of this Watch Committee, or the Watch Committee itself alone, get it, and the Working Members who represent them on a so-called 24-hour-a-day basis don't have it . . .

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Now I will have one more. During the war I saw an Operational Intelligence Center set up, and they tried to operate it without certain people being Comint cleared, and it fell apart in exactly 24 hours, and when the Commander discovered that was attempted, he said, "How stupid can you be? There is no such thing as being partially pregnant. They either are or they aren't, and if I have this material for my use, my protection, it has got to be cranked in." Well, somebody brought out the rules. The rule said that you could only clear so many people, and they gave them -- not their ranks and title, but their position. Now those are written in peacetime when there was only one position. He said, "I don't give a damn about rules." It turned out he was quite correct. I think rather than saying that we can do this, I think we have to approach it that the Watch Committee will have such stature that they will get it, and the way they handle it within themselves, they will insure as if only one person got it.

GENERAL LEWIS: I think we are talking about the same thing.

MR. SHELDON: I couldn't agree with you more.

GENERAL LEWIS: I think we are talking about exactly the same thing. I am visualizing a limited number of persons but not all of the persons belonging to the Center knowing about this, so that you will be reasonably assured that what you are talking about won't happen and yet that you don't unnecessarily spread this information, we will say, to members of the Secretariat who don't need to have it -- to stenographers and other people, in other words.

MR. SHELDON: In other words, you are embracing all of the substantive individuals?

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, it depends upon how many you are talking about when say all. Now if you are talking about the members in the Center who represent each one of the activities, and that would be a matter of four or five, possibly so, but to go much beyond that, I don't think so.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Well, I agree with you, General. I understood this Executive Session was only for the Watch Committee themselves, and the working Indians who were there all the time wouldn't have this . . .

GENERAL LEWIS: I don't think you would hold an Executive Session without some support from the full-time people. I wouldn't visualize it that way. Now maybe I don't have the proper concept and feel of what an Executive Session is here.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Well they described the Executive Session of the IAC in which only the principals remain.

GENERAL LEWIS: And everyone else leave.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Yes.

DR. REICHARDT: Everyone else but a supporting member of the . . . well, and also in some cases a supporting member of the Agency bringing up the sensitive material. This may happen, and I had in mind that at least that member on the Working Group whose Agency had this sensitive material, the Senior Member on the Working Group of that Agency at least would have it.

GENERAL LEWIS: It might even vary a little bit, but I would say in general it should be the minimum of the member on the Working Group who represents the member who is in the Executive Agency, so that would be two from each; but however we come out with it -- and it might vary from time to time -- I think that the principle is that somehow we have got to get everything into this Center even if we have to go to extremes to do it.

DR. REICHARDT: There is a great deal in which you said that has to be covered.

MR. TRUEHEART: Theoretically what you say you cannot argue with. It is absolutely right, but, as a practical matter, I don't think you are going to get the people to cut loose with the information unless you can assure them that it is going to go to absolutely a very small number of people.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: I don't see any real problem if the IAC members themselves, who are their intelligence chiefs of the various IAC Agencies, will be convinced -- this is a matter of convincing them -- that this is an absolute necessity. They are the ones who control the intelligence within their departments. No one else controls it, and it is up to them, and either they are an IAC member and cooperate with their own subcommittee or they don't,

and this thing to me is plain not salesmanship but presenting the facts and requirements.

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, that is the reason why I kind of feel we should shoot for extreme words in here. That is the reason why I kind of like this concept of "all".

MR. TRUEHEART: I want to point out, General, that my point in this paragraph d. now e., I hadn't in mind at all the thing you were talking about. I thought we covered that above in b., c., d., etc. I am just here arguing that we don't want to bind the Working Group to file every damn thing they get, but that isn't necessarily the best kind of a way to run a file. Not that they shouldn't get it, but I just don't want to make them keep it and put it in the file.

GENERAL LEWIS: I appreciate this paragraph isn't particularly on what you get, but I would like to go filter through the whole thing, the concept that this show gets all, and somehow arrange it so that they will get it all.

MR. TRUEHEART: I agree with that.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Wouldn't the insertion of the word "pertinent" in there cover both of the objections? In other words, the Watch Committee can determine which is pertinent. If they decide they want to do away with a certain file that has outlived its usefulness, they can do it, and I think this is getting a little too legal when it says "all" -- you have to keep everything including memoranda.

GENERAL LEWIS: I wouldn't be worried about that because I am sure they would throw away what they didn't think was worth keeping, but I kind of like the concept of saying "all", although I am one from staying away from extreme words, in general, but if you put . . . You might stick "pertinent" after "all" if you feel it is necessary.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Yes, I think it certainly wouldn't do any harm in there, and does give, confirm, the latitude there of this Committee.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: And, you see, you have a completion of a pertinent file. I would like to leave the "complete" in there, I think.

MR. TRUEHEART: Yes, I will buy that.

MR. SHELDON: Just add the word "pertinent" then after "all"?

GENERAL LEWIS: That would be my suggestion; yes, that would be fine.

MR. SHELDON: All right.

MR. TRUEHEART: But, of course, this means that that sensitive information that you are talking about is going to go in here.

GENERAL LEWIS: It will be somewhere, but it doesn't say that super-sensitive information is going to be in, but it will be somewhere, yes.

MR. TRUEHEART: It says "and integrated file" which means, General, you put it all together.

GENERAL LEWIS: No, not necessarily. The super stuff you would put separately.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: You don't have to have it all in the same room.

MR. TRUEHEART: To be integrated?

ADMIRAL LAYTON: No, sir, you go to any file, and if you get any size of files, they can't even be kept in any one room except possibly the big National Guard Armory down here, and then if you go a little further, and then I can think of the CIA in the next 10 years outgrowing that in the size of files.

MR. TRUEHEART: What does integrated mean?

ADMIRAL LAYTON: That you have cross-indexing; you have cross checking so that on any subject, or any area, or any matter you can go in and find like a librarian's file. If you don't even remember the book and you know what it is about you can go in there and find your leads from which you can go back and pick up the name of the author, and find the shelf number, and from the shelf number you go and find it. Don't get me off on intelligence file indexes.

MR. SHELDON: All right, let's tackle f. then.

CAPTAIN ELLER: Mr. Chairman, just one point on d. there. Do you want the word "available" in there? Do you want "all pertinent available intelligence"? It doesn't seem to me to contribute anything since if it was not available you wouldn't have it.

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MR. SHELDON: I will buy the deletion.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Well, I was all for leaving it in and depending on General Lewis' statement because it might not be available, and you might not have it.

GENERAL LEWIS: All right, it is back in.

CAPTAIN ELLER: I withdraw my comment.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: That is the fish hook.

CAPTAIN ELLER: Yes.

MR. SHELDON: I have some suggestions on the next item which would read somewhat along these lines: "Maintain and develop graphics, and mechanical aids, and techniques effectively to illustrate and assist in interpreting the current situation and long-range trends with respect to the Watch Committee mission." I am trying to get in there the idea that we have got to develop the art which at the moment is embryonic in tackling these things. I don't say we will ever be successful, but it seems to me that we have got to try a little.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: I think that should be a separate paragraph. I think doing what they are doing now should be in there separately and to develop another one where we can say this will not supplant in any way, be put on a trial basis, a check.

MR. SHELDON: We don't want to change the experiment in which --

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Not within the current watch function; otherwise you will muddy it.

MR. SHELDON: I do think we have to get that concept in somewhere along there.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: I will recommend that be done separately, and that will be one of the things they will do, and then they will develop, and then they will check this against the current human methods. To quote General Sanford and General Porter, they both have considerable experience with very competent firms -- electric brains people -- trying to work out something. There was the feeling, and it was expressed at the IAC, if you recall, they didn't want

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this thing to supplant it now. Mr. Dulles said that he didn't want to have any mechanical monster that would give the wrong election return.

MR. SHELDON: In addition to which your own paper that you submitted tried to set the experimental facet aside and apart from the --

ADMIRAL LAYTON: That is why I would recommend not putting it in here; put it in as a separate function.

MR. SHELDON: I think we have to put the idea in somewhere along the line, and as long as we get it in, that is all I care about.

GENERAL LEWIS: I would like to put your word "assist" though in front of both. I think you had it after the first . . . after the "interpret" didn't you?

MR. SHELDON: "Assist and interpret".

GENERAL LEWIS: I think we have to recognize that any of these things --

MR. SHELDON: "to most effectively assist in illustrating and interpreting."

GENERAL LEWIS: Yes, that is right that none of them are going to do anything more than assist, and that is the big danger, which I already agreed with you, and I have shied away from these things from time to time because I have worried about their becoming a mechanical matter and too much reliance being placed upon them, but I do think that they can be properly used as an aid.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: As a matter of fact, I know one case where they tried to run this mechanically -- an exercise -- just a test -- and they got about five indicators on one red line, four on the other one showing red when the thing was calm. It was a misinterpretation of indicator, but it came up mechanically.

GENERAL LEWIS: There is no replacement for brain work in this whole business, and the brain work has got to do most of it, and the aids can assist the brain work, but it can't be the other way around.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: These can jog the memory so the brain then can start to function.

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MR. SHELDON: I think "assist" is correct in this context. I suppose several years back if we had said to ourselves a mechanical translator was an impossibility we all would have probably agreed; however, this mechanical translator is starting to function on a very limited basis. I don't know if it will ever be useful. I suppose most of you are aware of the project.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: With the IBM and its potentialities there is no doubt it could be done with certain languages because you can do everything. I have seen the IBM perform marvelous feats.

MR. SHELDON: They have up to 250 words now. There was a test run up in New York about a week ago, and it is going to take 5, to 7, 8, 9, 10 years to develop several thousand word vocabulary which will be effective in a mechanical translation of Russian into English.

MR. TRUEHEART: It is that far off?

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Vocabulary isn't the stumbling block; it is syntax and grammar. You can crank in all kinds of words and use those as subjects, objects, modifiers, but when you get into syntax and grammar, that is really the trick. But the people here in Georgetown who first evolved the idea showed very fine grasp.

MR. SHELDON: Well, that is a sideline. Maybe one of these days we will have something that will assist us better. Let's put it that way. Do we have any other comments on f.?

MR. TRUEHEART: I am not clear what we have left here.

MR. SHELDON: What we have suggested at the moment is "maintain ^{wall} ~~way~~ maps, charts, and other display material which will most effectively assist in illustrating and interpreting graphically." That is as far as we have gotten.

DR. REICHARDT: Could we accept your wording of graphics, mechanical aids, and techniques to leave the thing open for the future if any of these are developed?

MR. SHELDON: Well, the concept here was we would write another sentence or so dealing with the experimental facets of this so we could use those words there. Otherwise we are going to be stumped for words if we use them

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all up in this paragraph.

GENERAL WILLEMS: In another paragraph.

DR. REICHARDT: What I meant . . . my viewpoint was so the next paragraph you will talk with developing things, and then if you develop one on the limitation of the present thing which does not include a mechanical aid necessarily, then you have to write a third paragraph to maintain it if this is going to be developed. In other words, looking to the future in the present wording.

GENERAL WILLEMS: These are not mechanical brains we will have by that time.

DR. REICHARDT: No, but what I meant was --

MR. SHELDON: In 1960 when we meet again we can crank that part in.

DR. REICHARDT: I am trying not to limit.

MR. SHELDON: Supposing we try our hand at submitting the next time a sentence that deals with the development aspect of mechanical aids. Frank, make a note of that.

MR. TRUEHEART: I think we ought again to go back to our standard phraseology whatever it is going to be.

MR. SHELDON: Yes, the end of the sentence is again --

CAPTAIN ELLER: Mr. Chairman, in relation to that you like the wording "preparations for attack" there in paragraph d.? It seems to me in thinking it over . . . I think it is a rather important point that that is more restrictive than the preparation for offensive action possibly.

MR. SHELDON: Well, we were going to try to find some similar solution.

CAPTAIN ELLER: Yes, I see.

MR. TRUEHEART: I thought we were using that for the moment at least, that phrase, old a. now b., "Soviet/Communist intentions as set forth in C,2 above."

MR. SHELDON: We can't crank that in at the end of each paragraph. Otherwise the thing is going to look dreadful.

MR. TRUEHEART: I think we just say "Soviet/Communist intentions" each time perhaps and --

MR. SHELDON: No, no, in e. we stopped at "all pertinent --

GENERAL LEWIS: "pertinent available indications intelligence."

MR. SHELDON: "-- indications intelligence."

MR. TRUEHEART: Oh, we did? I didn't know that.

MR. SHELDON: Yes, so we should find some similar technique in this sentence because we agreed we wouldn't constantly repeat and relabel this material.

MR. TRUEHEART: Couldn't you just stop after "trends"?

GENERAL LEWIS: I would think so.

MR. SHELDON: Or something like "and cumulative indicators"?

ADMIRAL LAYTON: I would like to recommend that you examine that one from the point of view of long-range trends that bear upon the mission. Your mission covers the water front again. Could say "bring to bear upon the mission of the Watch Committee."

MR. SHELDON: Well, that was my original sentence.

GENERAL LEWIS: Didn't you mean the long-range more in connection with your development project or not?

MR. SHELDON: It seems to me that one has got to have certain graphics which would portray the current situation and might in a sense be a projection of a trend. Otherwise you have a completely static series of graphics.

GENERAL LEWIS: Plotting what had happened and possibly projecting.

MR. SHELDON: Something of that sort, and I was trying to get that into the paper. Otherwise you are completely static in your presentation.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: I think that would be very pertinent where you would have, for example, a gradual reinforcement of ground forces in East Germany and where this be shown over a period that the number of reserves going out were less, and you wanted to plot this to show at a certain time they would reach instead of thirty divisions on hand they would have forty, and that might be considered at that time one of the pink light warnings that when they got forty there they would have more capability.

MR. SHELDON: That was why I was playing with the word "cumulative" there somewhere along the line.

CAPTAIN ELLER: I have also considered that at some length there, Mr. Chairman, in our discussions and find our feeling is that when we get into long-range, the use of long-range, you get into the division between estimates and indications whereas cumulative gives you the ability to keep current on background without going into the estimate field. That seems to be our general view, and I would agree with you certainly on current and cumulative indicators or something to that effect.

MR. SHELDON: That doesn't prohibit anybody projecting a line if they feel that it is warranted?

GENERAL WILLEMS: Do I understand you throw out "trends"?

MR. SHELDON: Well, the suggestion is "the current and cumulative indicators."

CAPTAIN ELLER: Yes, sir, that would be all right.

MR. SHELDON: How does that sound?

MR. TRUEHEART: Period?

MR. SHELDON: That would be my suggestion.

CAPTAIN ELLER: And again the last part would be covered by the opening phrase. In other words, this would come under some general paragraph which would cover in each case Soviet/Communist preparations or Soviet preparations for offensive action?

MR. SHELDON: Are we ready to move on to the next? Here is where I perhaps part company with the concept. I don't know whether I am alone in this thought. I would like to see something like after the word indications "a selection of indications and prepare draft reports and conclusions for consideration by the Committee" inserted in there, to carry out the direct support function, and I visualize the Indications Center Staff will provide that through the Committee itself. Otherwise I think there is a gap between what would be due, and direct, and immediate support to the Committee and its Chairman. That would in no sense deny the Committee the right to redraft, throw out, or edit such papers as are prepared for their consideration.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Well, as you know, Mr. Chairman, I hold a different

view on that, and because I am very apprehensive that we gradually lose if we have some system along those lines, that we will gradually lose the active participation by these key individuals that each agency will designate for the Committee in the preparation of the report of the indications and the conclusions. It is a difference in concept, I believe, a question of whether or not the report is more or less prepared for them to approve or whether or not after they have their meeting to consider all the indications they then develop the report as a result of the meeting.

MR. SHELDON: Wouldn't in practice this happen? At least I would assume it would happen, that is, the Committee member who was going to attend the official Committee meeting would have in effect guided and participated in the preparation of the staff work? I think that is inherent in the technique. In other words, he wouldn't arrive cold and not know what was going to be up for discussion. In other words, in one's own pre-watch meetings, which I assume most of us hold, what in effect would be presented to the Committee would in large part, barring items that came up over night, be considered by the senior personnel before the meeting.

GENERAL WILLEMS: But even so I am not so much afraid of the initiation of that in the initial period. What I am apprehensive of is the gradual, oh, sort of degeneration which I have seen happen a number of times here in Washington, into sort of quibbling over minutiae and the statements, etc., that you find in a paper. Also I must say this about the Watch Committee -- the period that I have observed: It is quite devoid of any departmental or agency positions. It is quite a pure group, I think, in that respect, and I believe that results from the fact that those people as Watch Committee members consider in a group what ought to be in the report or not, and they don't quibble much how it is said so long as it seems to carry out the thought. I am afraid if we go to another system of having them meet sort of to consider a paper we then get back into the other type of operation where they begin to take positions and begin to quibble over phraseology, etc., and you don't have the spontaneity that you do have in the present Watch Committee function.

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MR. SHELDON: What do the others around the table advise on this problem?

MR. KUHRITZ: I am inclined to agree, I think. A conclusion of each one is going to delay the feed of the material into the Center which, of course, our main concern is expedition there, and I might steer some intelligence or indication in there, but to have a conclusion on it if it is going in there in my case it is FBI material, and to get FBI conclusion is going to delay it. I might put Kuhrtz's conclusion on there, but I couldn't submit that as the FBI conclusion on some intelligence that we might submit, and I think it just delays the material getting in.

GENERAL LEWIS: This conclusion you are talking about though, aren't you talking about the final conclusion as a result of consideration of all the material that was brought forth in the Watch Committee?

MR. SHELDON: Isn't that what you are talking about? You are talking about the final conclusion, or are you talking about individual conclusions? Perhaps the word conclusions isn't correct. Perhaps it is recommendations with respect to conclusions that I am thinking of because the way we have got this thing set up here now, it is up to, as we have written it, the Staff members in the Indications Center to obtain evaluations of material from their home bases, so in effect the conclusions or the evaluations have already been arrived at and are available in the Center, so there is no time lost. That work has already been accomplished. What we are really talking about here is sorting out the items in effect which merit Committee consideration. That is what we are really talking about, I guess.

MR. KUHRITZ: In that case it seems to me like we will need the entire body to come up with a conclusion rather than a member or representative of a member agency which will have to be done, as General Willems indicated, at the meeting level.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Also there is one other thought too though, and that is that every principal member who goes in there who is a selected man, and he is a very high-powered individual. I think you have a wonderful group there representing all the agencies, but they all personally come to grasp with

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It all has to go through their collective brains and come out. If we get this other system, pretty soon we will have the system whereby the Working Group will be developing all of this, and it is pretty much their thinking that is reflected in the Watch report rather than the thinking of the key members of the Committee, and I think the Working Group should provide the assistance for the Committee to consider and go through the indications, but I don't believe that they should write up the indications or even propose wording.

DR. REICHARDT: Could you get back then in . . . I am trying to get some thoughts together to assist in the preparation of draft reports and evaluations.

MR. TRUEHEART: That is the next paragraph, isn't it?

DR. REICHARDT: Well, what we are doing is --

MR. SHELDON: No, g. is after the events so to speak.

MR. TRUEHEART: I thought that was what he was talking about. I am sorry.

DR. REICHARDT: No, I am talking about . . . I mean the Watch Committee member may not be able to do all of this alone. He is going to need the support, and the Indications Group is to bring these things to him, and thereby they would assist in the preparation of the reports -- leave out draft -- the individual agency provides to the Committee as they sit around the table with the evaluations which will be if you want to recommend a conclusion.

MR. SHELDON: You are suggesting then in effect something along the lines of an assist in preparing reports and conclusions?

DR. REICHARDT: Well, I am sort of trying to stay away from conclusions, being more --

MR. SHELDON: Maybe conclusions is wrong because it is the Committee itself that should reach the conclusions. I agree to that.

DR. REICHARDT: They are going to have to go out and assist the actual Committee member to go back to his own agency or through the working level to another agency to get an evaluation on a report.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: Well, I assume that evaluation is already in this Center. They have got all the material as of the time they meet.

DR. REICHARDT: Right.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: And it has all been evaluated by the experts in the agencies who are naturally supposed to be the best qualified for this evaluation; that this group has put all of these things together in their own minds, and they think there are some potential indicators, and they bring that to the attention of the individual members.

DR. REICHARDT: Right, well, in a sense you are correct, sir, that f. really is included in what we had up here in b., and c., and d., so that what we are getting back now to talking about is a., b., c., and d. are over-all missions, and we are now talking more in terms of the working functions of the Center itself, or Secretary, or call it whatever . . . I agree wholeheartedly with your idea that we have already done it, but if we are going to apparently break up this thing, then we will have to --

ADMIRAL LAYTON: I just wanted to add on there I think if they start drawing up draft reports or even a draft, I agree with General Willems that the tendency would be for the Watch Committee then to become a rubber stamp who will come in and give a stamped approval of what the working Indians have done, and in the course of time it is human . . . You have a bunch of people working it out. You go in and review it briefly under the harassment of other details and duties, and I think General Willems' statement they go through it, they sit down and go through the indications . . . They didn't have any draft conclusions or anything to start with. They have all the indications evaluations. All that is right there. Those have been selected by the working people so they won't have to look over a lot of things that are not considered valid. It probably is well not to let them do any drafting, let them keep in the Watch Officer type, let us say, rather than be the member of the Board of Directors.

DR. REICHARDT: Well, it could very readily -- I mean my suggestion -- be dropped. I was not trying to imply the word "assist" in the preparation of the report necessarily.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: I know you weren't, but if it was in here in that term it might give the impetus and the means. They will say, "Well, it is in there. Then actually your Watch Committee would come back to being your Working Group.

MR. SHELDON: Do I take it then that I find no support for this other general concept around the table?

MR. TRUEHEART: I have been in the unaccustomed position of not being quite sure where I stand. I certainly agree with what General Willems has said about the Committee remaining completely enmeshed in the process of evaluating material and coming up with conclusions, but what I take it --

MR. SHELDON: When you raised the question of substantive ^{competence} competition, I thoroughly agree with that that the designee must be a substantively competent individual. It is simply a question of how far the so-called staff goes, and where the transition, and where you crank in the more senior approach.

MR. TRUEHEART: To complete the thing, while I agree with that, on the other hand I am a great admirer of precision ⁱⁿ and expression, and I think it is most important that when they finish cogitating that whatever it was they concluded be conveyed accurately to the recipients, and to do that I think it is often helpful to have the people who had the ideas look at the words that are going to be used to express them, so I, as I say, am really between two bales of hay on this one.

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, you have some conflicts, and I don't think there is a natural solution. What level do you think now aside from personal capability -- youth versus old age or what not -- what level of officer do you think ought to sit on this Committee?

GENERAL WILLEMS: You mean to be a member of the Watch Committee?

GENERAL LEWIS: A member of the Watch Committee. Now do you think that your present unit level colonel is the proper level, or do you think that this level ought to be higher than that, if possible?

GENERAL WILLEMS: Well, let me say this, that I like the present Watch Committee very much. I think that is a very proper level in a billet. I

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I don't know about the relative ranks of certain individuals in their own services or agencies, etc., but we have somehow or other . . . I think they have developed about the ideal type of representative to be there.

GENERAL LEWIS: You think it is high enough?

GENERAL WILLEMS: Oh, I do, but I think it would be wrong to try to put an arbitrary level. I think we ought to emphasize the competence.

GENERAL LEWIS: I am not trying to label it, but I am trying to probe now just what you think it ought to be and whether or not you think it has been high enough in the past. I just have some impressions, but they don't jib with what you are saying. My impressions have been that you haven't been getting high enough representation to put the proper emphasis on this whole thing.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Well, I don't think that is where the difficulty has arisen. Of course, you would probably solve . . . that is one way of solving this difficulty by having a lot of very high-ranking people sit on the Committee, but if we would get or enlist the support of the rank behind the representative I think we would overcome this difficulty that we have.

GENERAL LEWIS: That is not a natural either.

GENERAL WILLEMS: What?

GENERAL LEWIS: That is not a natural either.

GENERAL WILLEMS: But my concern is that if you get the fellow who is high powered enough to arbitrarily demand to carry some authority with him, he then is involved in so many other high-powered things and high pressure affairs that he really doesn't or isn't able to devote as much time to this Committee as the present members are. We are still in the . . . May I say this? We are all still in the Working Group in the Committee. We are all workers. If we go too high, then we are not going to have that type of personnel there.

GENERAL LEWIS: But what you are going to do is that you are going to separate what you are doing now into two parts, aren't you? You separate it into working level people -- pick and shovelers -- and it is a question of how

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high they are going to go, and then you are going to have this Committee on top of them. Well, there are advantages and disadvantages both ways, and I share your fear, and I also am very much concerned about not getting enough emphasis behind this thing, so it is a question of how high up on the ladder as well as capable will this Board of Directors be, and I think that is one that needs a lot of thought. There is an awful lot to this careful preparation in advance theory, a great deal, and I expect we are going to have to compromise here somewhere and accept some more or less on each side. Maybe it will seek its own level; I don't know. My inclination at the moment is to try to seek the highest possible level within the organization structure that can provide you the emphasis and still the capability. You want to be able to talk intelligently, but let's see what the level is. The level is well below the main subdivision level in the other activities other than yourself, isn't it? In your case you are on a ^{main} ~~man~~ subdivision level, and the other people who attend this thing are not on that level at all.

MR. TRUEHEART: It seems to me you want your top Russian expert on this thing; that is all there is to it.

GENERAL LEWIS: On the Committee?

MR. TRUEHEART: Yes.

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, it is a question of how you are organized, you see. The organization you may be thinking about is quite different.

MR. TRUEHEART: Maybe so, but, of course, if he doesn't have . . . If he is just sort of a retired expert who is working on other matters, we don't want him, but I would qualify that by your top Russian expert who is still concerned on a day-to-day basis with Russian affairs is the man who ought to be on this Committee, and everybody ought to put this top man on it.

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, I will bracket that. I am afraid I am not prepared to say because there are too many conflicts here, but it is somewhere between that fellow and the guy who runs all analyses.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: I would like to make an observation since this is a Subcommittee, Subcommittee of the IAC, and intelligence bosses are the

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IAC members, it would seem to me that they are the ones that will each and individually determine who they put on.

MR. TRUEHEART: Oh, of course, they are.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: I mean in the interest of being the best represented. The guy they would put on might be a Russian expert, a Chinese expert, or an expert on nothing, but he would have good common horse sense for which there is no substitute.

MR. TRUEHEART: May I qualify by saying this is just my personal opinion.

ADMIRAL LAYTON: I wanted to add if I may that I don't think rank has anything to do with it. I think you can find some awfully good ones in the senior officers, and I include the rank I just had and the rank I am getting up to. I don't like to go back to the Pearl Harbor investigation, but I sat there and I heard senior officers make complete jackasses out of themselves, the people who are supposed to be mature, but when they could sit, and one of them sat there for five and one-half hours, and he said, "I don't know; I don't remember; I can't recall; I don't know; I don't remember," and they were simple questions, and he was a Naval Flight Officer too. There are others like him. So I don't think rank other than to have enough standing within his own organization is the measure of it. The measure of it is what the IAC bosses think is the best man they have in the organization to represent them.

GENERAL WILLEMS: I don't believe you can get away from what we tried to accomplish leading off from your preamble here of getting everybody on the topside interested in pressuring to get this Committee properly served in their Agency. I think that is where the authority and the weight of the authority should be felt in this setup that we are proposing.

MR. KUHZTZ: In my mind this representative is going to have to be quite a liaison man in his own agency to (1) win on a selling point and (2) to make sure that all the pertinent information is being properly handled for the Center.

MR. TRUEHEART: I think that will be more of a problem for the member of the Working Group than it will for the member of the Committee. I would

suspect that he would have sufficient stature that properly they would bring the stuff to him rather than his having to go look and beating the bushes for it.

DR. REICHARDT: It isn't a matter of necessarily the stature as it is the backing that the IAC member gives to this man and the authority that the IAC member gives to this man. In other words, take he is a colonel --

MR. TRUEHEART: In my department that is the case, and if the fellow doesn't know what he is talking about nobody is going to ask him any questions about it or bring the information to him. You can't just say that Joe Doaks is the Russian expert and expect anybody is going to treat him as such. He has to be a Russian expert.

DR. REICHARDT: I can see where this could run into difficulties in chains of command, etc., but then it seems if necessary it would mean a change in organization, put a separate little box out -- you know -- this type of thing. I thoroughly agree -- I don't know which member of the Committee made the suggestion -- that if you get too high in rank you just don't have the time to spend and the details that I gather everyone around the table feels is necessary in being a member of the Watch Committee.

GENERAL LEWIS: I am very interested in this. If you all feel that way, General, I then think must be the right solution in general, but you have got some insolubles here. You have a zone of insolubles that the only thing you can do is to compromise, and you are going to compromise something by either putting in these words or leaving them out, whichever concept you agree upon.

MR. TRUEHEART: Actually there is some compromise in effect now as I understand it. While the report is drafted after the meeting, it is true that the individual members often bring in the paragraph that they would like to see put in the report after it has been discussed. Isn't that right?

GENERAL WILLEMS: Yes, that is right.

MR. TRUEHEART: We are not the only group that does that, are we?

GENERAL WILLEMS: Oh, no, no.

MR. TRUEHEART: So you really have a kind of compromise between what you and Mr. Sheldon have been arguing here?

GENERAL WILLEMS: Well, but there is not an awful lot of debate over the thing.

MR. TRUEHEART: Over the wording.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Over the wording. We usually hit on . . . There has been a consideration of the matter; it has been discussed, and the person who draws up the proposed wording usually knows the general thinking of everyone else. They know what they will buy, etc., and they come up with a trial paragraph that is circulated around for size.

MR. SHELDON: Time is getting short. Why don't we see if we can come up with something that is perhaps a little more acceptable than the suggestion I made this morning. Why don't we see if we can narrow the problem down. I will do that by the next meeting -- see if I can get over this immediate hurdle that we have been having here. Yes, certainly there is no desire on our part to compound a felony here in having the Committee become a rubber stamp. That is in no sense . . . We are aware of that problem too, and perhaps we can find a solution that will be acceptable to everybody. I think we had better kind of stick to our normal time schedule, and perhaps this is a good time to call it a day.

(There being no further business to come before the committee,
the meeting adjourned at 12:29 P.M.)